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INTRODUCTION 
Senior Department of Defense leaders make numerous decisions about the appropriate utilization of 
complex scientific and technological innovations. These decisions are especially problematic because of the 
difficulty in assessing risks, benefits, costs, and unintended consequences of these new discoveries. However, 
decisions related to the proper investment, implementation, and deployment of technological innovation 
must be made, even if they must be considered under conditions of uncertainty by decision makers with only 
limited information and scientific expertise. 
The challenge is, therefore, to make the best possible decision with the best information available, using 
the best decision-making technique possible, even in the face of limited information and uncertain outcome. 
The purpose of this study was to increase our understanding of how, under conditions of limited information 
and uncertainty, the framing of scientific and technological information influences decision making. If we 
understand the decision processes that key decision makers undergo in assessing choices under uncertainty, 
we can help structure conditions that maximize their ability to access the types of information they really need 
to make the best decisions in real settings. 
While we looked specifically at how individuals, in an environment of uncertainty, make decisions on the 
application of scientific and technological innovation to one problem, we were primarily interested in 
understanding the dynamics of decision-making involving the application of science and technology to 
problem solving and choice making generally. Once this is known, organization leaders can work to provide 
the structure set of decision tools that will facilitate information retrieval and utilization and that decision 
makers need to grapple with large amounts of sometimes conflicting information. In this project, we sought a 
general understanding of the decision processes individuals engage in as they seek to apply technological 
innovations to a particular problem. The context we set up to arrive at this understanding was the choice of 
what technologies to employ in a set of specific scenarios regarding the war on terror. 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The purpose of the study is to increase our understanding of how, under conditions of limited 
information, the factors of uncertainty and the framing of scientific and technological information influence 
decision making about the appropriate utilization of complex scientific and technological innovations. 
The experiments used in this project were developed around the choice of new technologies in a set of 
scenarios regarding the war on terror. Experiments were designed to enable researchers to examine the ways 
decision makers choose from among three categories of antiterrorism technologies or do nothing under 
different conditions of certainty and framing. 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
The poliheuristic theory of decision making was used as the basis for the study. The poliheuristic theory 
incorporates the conditions surrounding policy decisions, as well as the cognitive processes associated with 
these surroundings. It posits that decision makers employ a two-stage decision process: in the first stage, 
decision makers screen available alternatives utilizing cognitive-based heuristic strategies; in the second stage, 
when the decision matrix has been reduced to a more manageable number of alternatives and dimensions, 
decision makers resort to analytic, expected utility, or lexicographic rules of choice in an effort to minimize 
risks and maximize rewards (Mintz and Geva 1997; Mintz et al. 1997). The poliheuristic theory also posits 
that different decision heuristics and strategies may be employed in response to different decision tasks as a 
function of environmental and/or cognitive constraints. 
The poliheuristic theory is based on five main processing characteristics of decision making: (1) 
nonholistic search, (2) dimension-based processing, (3) noncompensatory decision rules, (4) satisficing 
behavior, and (5) order-sensitive search (see Mintz and Geva 1997; Mintz et al. 1997). For the purposes of 
this project we concentrate on dimension-based processing, noncompensatory decision rules, and on 
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maximizing versus satisficing behavior. A dimension is defined as the thematic basis (or criterion) underlying 
the evaluation of an alternative. Alternatives represent different courses of action such as “accept” and 
“reject.” The poliheuristic theory asserts that in situations where cognitive complexity is high or in any 
situation wherein leaders are faced with cognitive and/or environmental constraints, decision makers will use 
a dimension-based process instead of an alternative-based approach for processing information. The theory 
also posits that decision makers ‘satisfice’ rather than ‘maximize’ utility (Mintz and Geva, 1997; Mintz et al., 
1997). The difference between maximizing and satisficing decision strategies is that, in the former, alternatives 
are compared to one another, and the alternative with the highest utility is chosen. In the latter, alternatives 
are compared to a threshold, and the first alternative to meet or surpass that threshold is selected. The 
poliheuristic theory stresses satisficing, not only because it is concerned with finding ‘acceptable’ alternatives 
instead of maximizing ones, but also because it is possible that not all dimensions or alternatives will be 
considered prior to a decision being made. 
PROCESS TRACING METHODS AND 
THE DECISION BOARD PLATFORM 
Process tracing is a methodology designed to identify what information is being accessed to form a 
judgment and the order in which the information is accessed. Data gathered from process tracing can then be 
used to make inferences about which decision strategies were employed en route to a choice. To facilitate 
process tracing, a computerized system¾the Decision Board (www.decisionboard.org/academic) was 
developed by Dr. Alex Mintz and utilized in this study. 
The core structure of the Decision Board is a matrix of alternatives and dimensions on which the 
alternatives are evaluated. The computerized Decision Board records key features of the decision-making 
process: (a) the sequence in which decision makers acquire the information, (b) the number of items that 
respondents view for every alternative along every dimension, and (c) the amount of time that elapses from 
the time respondents begin the task until they make their choice. Using process-tracing techniques, the 
Decision Board also displays the “decision portraits” of decision makers and calculates maximizing versus 
satisficing decision rules. For this project, a policy scenario dealing with combating terrorism was used to 
introduce alternatives and dimensions into the Decision Board.  
METHODS 
Subjects 
Forty-six undergraduate students at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee (UWM) and fifty officers at 
National Defense University (NDU) participated in the initial experiment. The undergraduate student 
subjects, who were randomly recruited from several political science courses, provided a comparison and 
control for the NDU sample. The officers were recruited from a leadership course taught over two semesters 
at NDU. The subjects were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions.  
Design 
A 2 X 2 between-groups factorial design was employed. The two factors were as follows: (1) Framing of 
likelihood of funding (emphasis on probability of being funded vs. emphasis on probability of not being 
funded), and (2) Certainty effects (certain vs. uncertain that technology will function as designed). We also 
measured the choices subjects made and Information Acquisition Patterns: The choices subjects made were 
categorized as “correct” and “incorrect” choices. Information acquisition patterns include alternative-based 
or dimension-based strategies, and compensatory or non-compensatory decision rules. Measures of 
alternative vs. dimension-based processing are calculated using Billings and Scherer’s (1988) search index. The 
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compensatory vs. noncompensatory measure comes from Astorino-Courtois (2000). We also used the 
noncompensatory measure devised by Mintz and Geva (1997) to verify the Astorino-Courtois measure. 
The Research Instrument 
A 4 X 3 (alternatives X dimensions) matrix was implemented. The Decision Board included twelve 
information bins, which contained information pertaining to the evaluation of a given alternative along a 
given dimension. The information was presented as an evaluative statement followed by a corresponding 
numerical evaluation. Decision makers could open any information bin by clicking on it. Subjects indicated 
their choices by clicking on a choice button underneath the corresponding alternative. Each subject dealt with 
only one of the four following conditions: positive framing-certain technology, positive framing-uncertain 
technology, negative framing-certain technology, and negative framing-uncertain technology. 
Experimental Manipulations 
In order to determine the influence of the importance of advisers and the order of their appearance in 
decision processes and to determine the influence of decision processes on choice, two factors were 
examined: framing and uncertainty. 
Manipulation of Framing 
Subjects in the positive framing condition were told, “At the present time, because of the war on 
terrorism, there is approximately a 90% chance that Congress will fund at least one of these options. 
Congress has committed verbally and in writing to do whatever it takes to protect the American public from 
terrorism.” In contrast, those in the negative framing condition were told, “At the present time, because of 
the recent war in Iraq, there is approximately a 10% chance that Congress will not fund any of these options. 
Congress may be constrained in its spending because of a weak domestic economy and the ongoing war in 
Iraq and the cost of the war approaching $100 billion.” 
Manipulation of Certainty 
Subjects in the certain condition were told, “At this stage there is a high level of certainty that these 
future technologies will be successful and will work as conceived of and designed. Many in the scientific 
community are encouraged by the progress made so far and are hopeful that these options and the 
technology associated with them will actually work.” In contrast, those in the uncertain condition were told, 
“At this stage there is a high level of uncertainty about whether these future technologies will be successful 
and will work as conceived of and designed. Many in the scientific community are skeptical about the 
progress made so far and doubt that these options and the technology associated with them will actually 
work.” 
Since many policy decisions are made under time and informational constraints, all of the subjects were 
subjected to time pressure in order to increase the “mundane reality” (Aronson and Carlsmith 1968). The 
experimental manipulation consisted of instructions indicating that there was a time constraint. However, the 
subjects were not actually restricted in the amount of time available. 
Procedure 
The undergraduate students were administered the experiment in a computer lab at the University of 
Wisconsin-Milwaukee and the NDU attendees were tested via the National Defense University. Each subject 
operated online on a computer. The instructions and decision scenarios were displayed on the computer 
screen. Subjects were informed that they would be presented with a specific scenario concerning various 
technologies being developed to combat terrorism and with a decision matrix containing alternatives and the 
evaluations of those alternatives along three different dimensions: military, economic, and political. The 
subjects were instructed to make the best choice among the available options. Following the policy decision, a 
post-decision questionnaire was administered, followed by a detailed debriefing. 
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MAIN FINDINGS 
The study yielded the following findings1: 
1. Uncertainty affected subjects’ choices. Uncertainty generally led to higher proportions of subjects 
making the “correct” decision as officers sought more information when there was uncertainty about 
the technologies. The major exception occurred for the military subjects when they were also 
employing noncompensatory strategies. When noncompensatory strategies were used, certainty aided 
the military subjects in choosing “correctly.” 
2. Uncertainty also affected decision makers’ selection of decision strategies. Military commanders 
employed alternative-based procedures when faced with uncertainty. 
3. Framing affected choice. In general, positive framing led to a greater likelihood of participants making 
the “correct” choice. 
4. Military commanders tended to use satisficing strategies. This could be interpreted to mean that 
greater experience and familiarity with the general problem area (antiterrorism) encouraged a more 
realistic, compromise position among the military subjects. 
5. We found a significant difference between the student and military groups in their choices of 
compensatory versus noncompensatory processing. The military subjects were more likely to choose 
noncompensatory processing strategy than the student subjects. This finding suggests that military 
officers resorted to the use of cognitive shortcuts to a greater degree than did their student 
counterparts. 
6. We analyzed differences between the two groups in the number of information bins accessed and 
found that the military subjects tended to gather less information than the student subjects en route to 
choice. 
7. Military commanders were very reluctant to choose the Do Nothing option while student subjects 
were much more likely to do so. 
8. The military commanders overwhelmingly favored the Border Crossing Sensors option while the 
student subjects were more evenly split between Border Crossing Sensors and the Do Nothing 
options. It may be that the positive evaluations for that alternative for both the military and political 
dimensions outweighed the higher positive score along the military dimension for the Local 
Emergency Responder option. 
                                                          
1These results were not always replicated with the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee (UWM) student subjects. 
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LESSONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Our research findings convey some important messages and applied lessons about how uncertainty and 
framing of scientific and technological information may influence decision processes and outcomes.  
First, uncertainty about technological innovations is not necessarily undesirable in real decision situations 
as decision makers tend to seek more information when there is uncertainty about their choices. The general 
implication of the findings on the effects of uncertainty is that, in the case of experienced decision makers, 
when more information is thought to be essential for making good decisions, learning tools that stress the 
uncertainty of the issue are more likely to lead to the use of alternative-based information search strategies 
and the accessing of more information before decisions are made. This finding also has implications for the 
presentation of information on which decision makers act. 
Second, different framing of the same decision problem do affect decision process and choice outcomes, 
even for seasoned decision makers. Special training and experimentation with multiple frames and deep 
analysis on possible choice outcomes may make decision makers more aware of the general tendency to be 
influenced by the way information is presented. 
Third, regardless of certainty or uncertainty and positive vs. negative framing, experienced decision 
makers, such as the military officers at National Defense University, tend to choose “doing something” even 
when “doing nothing” is an option and, in fact, even when “doing nothing” is the highest rated option. 
Military planners may need to pay more attention to this action orientation and minimize the risk of only 
making action-based choices when sometimes, “doing nothing” is actually the best option. 
Fourth, our study shows that as an emerging theoretical framework¾the poliheuristic decision theory¾ 
may represent a viable alternative theoretical framework to the existing decision models and can be used in 
various education and training programs in the fields of risk management, conflict resolution, leadership, 
foreign policy analysis, strategic planning, and political decision making. The poliheuristic theory embodies 
fundamental elements of both rational and cognitive decision models and incorporates the conditions 
surrounding policy decisions, as well as the rational and cognitive processing characteristics associated with 
these surroundings. 
Fifth, our study also demonstrates the potential of the Decision Board as a training and support tool for 
decision making on complex choice situations involving uncertainty, limited information and potential 
framing effects.  
Finally, we recommend that future research should further explore the important issues we examined 
in this study, including 1) replication of these experiments to shed more light on the validity of the results; 
2) further investigation of the role of uncertainty in information searches; 3) exploration of appropriate 
training in the influence of framing, and the role of factors such as accountability, ambiguity, and information 
availability. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Senior Department of Defense leaders make numerous decisions about the appropriate utilization of 
complex scientific and technological innovations. These decisions can be especially problematic because of 
the difficulty in assessing risks, benefits, costs and unintended consequences of these new discoveries. 
However, decisions related to the proper investment, implementation and deployment of technological 
innovation must be made, even if they must be considered under conditions of uncertainty by decision 
makers with only limited information and scientific expertise. The challenge is, therefore, to make the best 
possible decision, with the best information available, using the best decision-making technique possible, even 
in the face of limited information and uncertain outcome. 
The purpose of the study reported here and the follow-up study reported in the Appendix C is to 
increase our understanding of how, under conditions of limited information, the factors of uncertainty and 
the framing of scientific and technological information influence decision making. While this project looks at 
how individuals, in an environment of uncertainty, make decisions on the application of scientific and 
technological innovation to a specific problem, the goal is to understand the dynamics of decision making 
involving the application of science and technology to problem solving and choice making generally. By 
examining decision making behavior in a specific case, we gain general information and understanding. This 
information can be used by organization leaders to provide the set of decision tools that will facilitate 
information retrieval and utilization that decision makers need to grapple with large amounts of sometimes 
conflicting information. 
The experiments used in this project to examine decision making were developed around the choice of 
technologies to employ in a set of scenarios regarding the war on terror. Since the terrorist attacks on the 
United States on September 11, 2001, the United States has been engaged in a “War on Terror.” This war on 
terror has taken several forms, from a revamped warning system to military operations in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. Many of the initiates in the war on terror have centered on detecting evidence of terror activity and 
terrorist operations. These include the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), Talon, Guardian, the Joint 
Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense (JPEO-CBE), Project Bioshield, Customs 
and Border Protection (CBP), and the Container Security Initiative (CSI) (Redd, 2005). Moreover, numerous 
companies and research centers have been developing various technologies focused on helping the United 
States detect the presence of weapons of mass destruction. We searched the Internet and found several 
companies and organizations discussing various technologies for detecting the presence or “launch” of 
weapons of mass destruction (e.g. Biowatch, Thermo Electron Corporation). Most of these technologies 
seemed to fall into three basic categories, which we have labeled border-crossing type sensors, environmental type 
monitors, and more localized emergency responders (see also Campbell and Heilweil 2003). 
Experiments were designed to enable researchers to examine the ways decision makers choose from 
among these three categories of antiterrorism technology vs. Do Nothing under different conditions of 
certainty and framing. Vertzberger (1990, 384-5) notes that uncertainty “means confusion about the meaning 
of environmental configurations.” In this sense, uncertainty can be interpreted as a decision maker not being 
clear about what message any particular piece of information is conveying. Vertzberger (1990, 366), citing 
Scott (1982) also states that uncertainty can be thought of as the “ratio of anticipated to unanticipated 
consequences.”1 This definition relates more to the consequences of decision making than the nature of the 
information itself. We deal with uncertainty in the second sense. In the current war on terror, many of the 
technologies for detecting the presence of weapons of mass destruction are new and relatively untested on a 
mass scale. In other words, there is no guarantee that they will work as intended. We want to investigate how 
uncertainty influences decision making in the context of possibly using these technologies in the war on 
terror. 
                                                          
1See Castellan (1993), Hogarth (1990), Juslin and Montgomery (1999), and Svenson and Maule (1993) for further 
discussion of the concept of uncertainty. 
research findings & conclusions 
Decision Making Under Conditions of Uncertainty: Experimental Assessment of Decision Models 4 
Research Supported by the National Defense University, Contract No. DABJ29-03-P-0084 
Institute for Science, Technology and Public Policy, George Bush School of Government and Public Service 
Texas A&M University 
Framing is the second variation manipulated in these experiments. International relations and foreign 
policy are replete with examples of individuals, groups, organizations, and institutions attempting to frame 
their policies and/or the intentions and actions of others. From President Ronald Reagan’s references to the 
Soviet Union as the “Evil Empire,” to Arab and Israeli leaders blaming each other for the continued Intifada, 
to former President George H. W. Bush’s calling Saddam Hussein “Hitler,” we can see that framing is an oft-
used technique in international relations and foreign policy discourse. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981, 453) refer to a decision frame as: 
The decision maker’s conception of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated with a 
particular choice. The frame that a decision maker adopts is controlled partly by the norms, 
habits, and personal characteristics of the decision maker. 
Tversky and Kahneman (453) proceed to explain that it is quite possible to frame any particular decision 
in many different ways. In a similar vein, Frisch (1993) uses the term “framing effects” in reference to the 
experimental findings that individuals often respond differently to different descriptions of the same decision 
problem. According to Feldman (1995, 267-268), “frames focus attention on specific dimensions 
(explanations) for understanding issues . . . frames highlight connections between issues and particular 
considerations, increasing the likelihood that these considerations will be retrieved when thinking about an 
issue.” 
We believe that framing effects are a crucial variable in any rigorous examination of decision making in 
the context of the war on terror. How the options for detecting the presence of weapons of mass destruction 
are framed to decision makers is an important factor in determining the reasons for choice. Before discussing 
how these two factors, uncertainty and framing, were manipulated in our experiments we first provide a brief 
discussion of the theoretical and conceptual foundations of our argument. 
POLIHEURISTIC THEORY 
The poliheuristic theory of decision making incorporates the conditions surrounding policy decisions, as 
well as the cognitive processes associated with these surroundings (Mintz and Geva 1997). In other words, it 
concentrates on the “why” and “how” of decision making, which makes the theory relevant to both the 
contents and the processes of decision making. The term, poliheuristic, can be subdivided into the roots poly 
(many) and heuristic (shortcuts), which refers to the cognitive mechanisms decision makers utilize in attempts 
to simplify complex decision tasks (Geva, Redd, and Mintz 2000; Mintz and Geva 1997; Mintz et al. 1997). 
Abelson and Levi (1985, 255) citing Braunstein (1976) define heuristics as “problem-solving methods which 
tend to produce efficient solutions to difficult problems by restricting the search through the space of 
possible solutions.” Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991, 19) state “Heuristics are judgmental shortcuts, 
efficient ways to organize and simplify political choices, efficient in the double sense of requiring relatively 
little information to execute, yet yielding dependable answers even to complex problems of choice.” They 
further note that through the use of heuristics “people can be knowledgeable in their reasoning about political 
choices without necessarily possessing a large body of knowledge about politics” (ibid.). 
The poliheuristic theory of decision making proposes that decision makers employ a two-stage decision 
process where in the first stage decision makers screen available alternatives utilizing cognitive-based heuristic 
strategies. In the second stage, when the decision matrix has been reduced to a more manageable number of 
alternatives and dimensions, decision makers resort to analytic, expected utility, or lexicographic rules of 
choice in an effort to minimize risks and maximize rewards (Mintz 1993; Mintz et al. 1997; Payne et. al. 1993). 
The first phase in the decision process typically involves a nonexhaustive search wherein decision makers 
process information across dimensions in an attempt to select “surviving” alternatives before the completion 
of the consideration of all alternatives along all dimensions (Mintz and Geva 1997; Mintz 1993). As Mintz et 
al. (1997, 554) state, “Often, foreign policy decisions are based on the adoption or rejection of alternatives 
according to one or at most a few critical criteria.” Suedfeld and Tetlock (1992, 55-56) point out that human 
beings as cognitive managers “react to specific challenges and opportunities . . . [by adjusting] the complexity 
research findings & conclusions 
Decision Making Under Conditions of Uncertainty: Experimental Assessment of Decision Models 5 
Research Supported by the National Defense University, Contract No. DABJ29-03-P-0084 
Institute for Science, Technology and Public Policy, George Bush School of Government and Public Service 
Texas A&M University 
of their information processing in response to variables such as the importance of the decision, the 
reversibility of the decision, [and] the need to justify one’s views to an audience or constituency.” After this 
initial screening, the second phase of decision making consists of a lexicographic or maximizing decision rule 
used in selecting an alternative from the subset of “surviving” alternatives.2 
Another key premise of the poliheuristic theory is its reference to the political aspects of decision making 
in policy context. The assumption is that the decision maker measures costs and benefits, risks and rewards, 
gains and losses, and success and failure in terms of their political ramifications above all else (Mintz 1993). 
Mintz and Geva (1997) note that politicians value gains and losses in political terms, and domestic politics is 
the essence of decision. Furthermore, politicians are concerned about challenges to their leadership, their 
prospects of political survival, and their level of support. Because loss aversion (Jervis 1992; Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979; Levy 1992a, 1992b) outweighs all other considerations, leaders are driven more by avoiding 
failure than by attaining success (Anderson 1983). As Mintz and Geva (1997, 84) assert, “the political 
dimension is important in . . . policy decisions not so much because politicians are driven by public support 
but because they are averse to loss and would therefore reject alternatives that may hurt them politically.” 
DeRouen (1994, 2001) concurs by stating that a leader’s perception of the political consequences of his/her 
policies plays a decisive role in affecting the means chosen to deal with a foreign policy crisis. The theory, 
then, suggests procedures for eliminating alternatives by adopting or rejecting courses of action based on this 
political heuristic in a two-stage decision process (Mintz et al. 1997). 
The theory also posits that different decision heuristics may be employed in response to different 
decision tasks as a function of environmental and personal variations. This premise implies that these 
decision heuristics and strategies may be suboptimal (i.e., not always the “best”). A decision strategy is 
composed of a set of procedures “that the decision maker engages in when attempting to select from among 
alternative courses of action, and a decision rule that dictates how the results of the engaged-in procedures 
will be used to make the actual decision” (Beach and Mitchell 1978, 439-40; quoted in Mintz et al. 1997). 
Again, decision makers not only use different strategies depending on various environmental and/or 
cognitive constraints (Geva, Redd, and Mintz 2000; Maoz 1986, 1997; Mintz and Geva 1997; Mintz et al. 
1997), they also resort to the use of different strategies en route to a single choice (Mintz and Geva 1997; 
Mintz et al. 1997; Payne et al. 1993). 
The poliheuristic proposition that decision makers are flexible in the selection of a decision heuristic in a 
choice situation differs from one of the main propositions of expected utility theory (see Hogarth 1987; 
Simon 1990). Expected utility theory assumes that a single decision rule is adopted for any decision task and 
that this decision rule is kept throughout the entire task. Specifically, “the procedures are the computation of 
product sums of subjective probabilities and utilities for each alternative and the decision rule is 
maximization-selection of the alternative with the maximum product sum” (Beach and Mitchell 1978, 440). 
However, past research (see Abelson and Levi 1985; Maoz 1997; Olshavsky 1979; Payne, Bettman, and 
Johnson 1988, 1993) has shown that processing characteristics vary as a result of the choice environment. 
The poliheuristic theory specifically states that decision procedures and rules are not “fixed;” instead they 
vary depending on intervening variables such as one’s goals, the domain in which a decision maker operates, 
and other situational constraints (Mintz 1997; Mintz et al. 1997).3 The poliheuristic theory, then, is compatible 
with a host of contingency theories of decision and judgment which credit the decision maker with enough 
flexibility to adapt his/her decision process to changing problem and environmental demands and to his/her 
own cognitive/individual traits (Abelson and Levi 1985; Beach and Mitchell 1978; Mintz et al. 1997; Payne, 
Bettman, and Johnson 1988, 1993; Tetlock 1992; Tetlock and Boettger 1989). 
                                                          
2Mintz and Geva (1997) distinguish between the adoption or acceptance of alternatives vs. the rejection of options. 
3March and Olsen (1989) refer to the selection of decision rules in terms of anticipatory action vs. consequential action. 
We would argue that anticipatory action corresponds more closely to rational choice/expected utility notions of 
“[choosing] the alternative that has the best consequences” (ibid. 23) whereas obligatory action is more closely associated 
with cognitive approaches that emphasize “[doing] what is most appropriate” (ibid.). 
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The poliheuristic theory thus embodies fundamental elements of two disciplines concerned with decision 
making: cognitive psychology and political science (Hermann 1986, x-xi; see also Mintz et al. 1997). “From 
the former, the interesting questions center around how the decision maker(s) selects or rejects alternatives in 
light of time constraints, uncertainties, risks, task complexities, and so forth. From the latter come political 
issues, à la Lasswell, such as who wins and who loses politically as a consequence of the decision.” (Mintz et 
al. 1997, p. 554). 
The poliheuristic theory is based on five main processing characteristics of decision making: (1) 
nonholistic search, (2) dimension-based processing, (3) noncompensatory decision rules, (4) satisficing 
behavior, and (5) order-sensitive search (see Mintz and Geva 1997; Mintz et al. 1997). For the purposes of 
this project we concentrate on dimension-based processing, noncompensatory decision rules, and on 
maximizing versus satisficing behavior. 
Dimension-Based Processing 
Alternative vs. dimension-based strategies have been identified in the literature (see Ford et al. 1989; 
Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1988, 1993) as two “pure” modes of information acquisition. A dimension can 
be represented in a number of different ways. It can be thought of as an organizing theme (OT) for related 
information as well as variables (Ostrom et al. 1980). In this sense, a political dimension that conveys the 
political implications of a chosen alternative could include variables such as public opinion polls, domestic 
opposition, the leader’s popularity and other such factors related to this general organizing theme (see also 
Mintz and Geva 1997). A dimension can also be thought of as the thematic basis (or criterion) underlying the 
evaluation of an alternative. For example, the Secretary of Defense would be responsible for presenting 
evidence pertaining to the feasibility of any military operation (Geva, DeRouen, and Mintz 1993; Geva, Redd, 
and Mintz 2000; Mintz et al. 1997).4 
Alternatives represent different courses of action such as “accept” and “reject.” Alternative-based 
strategies imply a process whereby a decision maker sequentially reviews all items of information within a 
given alternative across dimensions and then proceeds in this manner for any subsequent alternatives. In 
contrast, a dimension-based strategy signifies that an individual focuses on a given dimension and then 
reviews information within that dimension across alternatives and then continues the process for another 
dimension (Payne 1976). Riggle and Johnson (1996) have suggested that these two modes of decision making 
symbolize two poles along an information-processing continuum (see also Mintz et al. 1997). 
Identifying these two modes of processing information is important both because of what various 
decision theories have to say about which strategy a decision maker will utilize as well as what they suggest 
about a decision maker’s attempts to deal with task complexities. Because expected utility speaks of 
maximizing product sums across alternative courses of action, it implies an alternative-based search on the 
part of decision makers. Changes from alternative to dimension-based strategies (or vice versa) can also be 
thought of in terms of reactions to cognitive complexity. Olshavsky (1979), Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 
(1988, 1993), and other scholars (e.g., Mintz et al. 1997) have shown that processing characteristics vary as a 
result of the choice environment. In other words, the strategy that a decision maker employs is very often 
contingent upon, among other things, the difficulty of the task being undertaken. Olshavsky (1979) notes that 
increasing task complexity leads to decision strategies that attempt to alleviate cognitive strain. Russo and 
Dosher (1983) specifically state that intradimensional, or dimension-based, processing is cognitively easier and 
hence more likely to be employed in cognitively demanding conditions. Therefore, strategy shifts from 
alternative-based to dimension-based procedures (or vice versa) can be “conceptualized as a movement 
between more complex, more demanding . . . reasoning (associated with the alternative-based strategy) and 
less complex, less demanding . . . rules (associated with a dimension-based strategy)” (Mintz et al. 1997, 554-
                                                          
4This conceptualization is somewhat stylized and pure in nature; of course, it is quite possible—and surely probable—
that advisers often represent or comment on more than one dimension. For example, it would be quite plausible to 
expect that the Chief of Staff (political adviser) might also offer advice pertaining to the economic or diplomatic 
ramifications of a given alternative. 
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55). The poliheuristic theory asserts that in situations where cognitive complexity is high or in any situation 
wherein leaders are faced with cognitive and/or environmental constraints, decision makers will use an 
attribute, or dimension-based process instead of an alternative-based approach for processing information. 
Noncompensatory Strategies 
In general, the compensatory principle refers to decision strategies that attempt to make trade-offs among 
attributes (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993). High values on one attribute (dimension) can compensate for 
low values on another dimension (ibid.; see also Billings and Scherer 1988; Ford et al. 1989; Hogarth 1987; 
Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1988). In contrast, the noncompensatory principle suggests, “a low score on 
one dimension cannot be compensated for by a high score on another dimension” (emphasis added) (Ford et 
al. 1989; see also Billings and Marcus 1983; Billings and Scherer 1988; Hogarth 1987; Payne, Bettman, and 
Johnson 1988, 1993). In other words, decision makers do not make trade-offs between high and low scores. 
Hogarth (1987, 77) states that, psychologically, trade-offs are difficult to make because decision makers find 
them difficult to execute as a result of “information-processing limitations.”5 
Both expected utility and cybernetic theories of decision making assume decision makers typically utilize 
compensatory decision rules. In contrast, cognitive approaches, including the poliheuristic theory of decision 
making, posit that decision makers employ noncompensatory rules of decision making. Mintz (1995, 337) 
states “Numerous experimental studies . . . [investigating] how decisions are actually being made reveal that 
seldom do decision makers employ holistic or compensatory processes during complex decisions” (emphasis 
in original) (see also Ford et al. 1989; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1988). 
The noncompensatory principle of decision making has been examined in a number of different contexts 
as well as through the use of various methods. We present here a few of the more important contributions 
that have addressed the noncompensatory principle either in whole or in part. 
The literature on the noncompensatory principle began as a concern with the cognitive and psychological 
processes of decision making in general. The noncompensatory principle was first discussed by scholars such 
as Einhorn (1970, 1971), Payne (1976), and Olshavsky (1979) who were concerned about how the complexity 
of decision tasks affected decision processes. Using various experimental methods (verbal protocols and 
information boards), these authors found that as task complexity increased, so did the use of 
noncompensatory strategies. Billings and Scherer (1988) used an information search board in an experiment 
between judgment and choice and found that choice situations led to more EBA (i.e., noncompensatory) 
strategies than did judgment situations. Ford et al. (1989, 75) summarized the literature in general that 
employed both verbal protocols and information board experimental methodologies and found 
“noncompensatory strategies were the dominant mode used by decision makers” (see also Payne, Bettman, 
and Johnson 1988). While these studies are important and paved the way for future research, they have been 
restricted to decision making in general, and have excluded the study of political decision making.  
Mintz (1993), in his study of the Persian Gulf war, began the extension of the noncompensatory principle 
to the field of foreign policy decision making. Specifically, Mintz (ibid.) argued that the decision by the United 
States to attack Iraq followed the noncompensatory principle of elimination by aspects (EBA). Mintz (ibid., 
598) specified the noncompensatory principle for use in foreign policy situations by arguing that the political 
dimension is the paramount attribute. Moreover, “in a choice situation, if a certain alternative is unacceptable 
on a given dimension (e.g., it is unacceptable politically), then a high score on another dimension (e.g., the 
military) cannot compensate/counteract for it, and hence the alternative is eliminated” (emphasis in original) 
(see also Mintz and Geva 1997). By examining historical documents and written accounts of the deliberations 
leading up to the conflict, Mintz (1993, 606-7) was able to show that the political dimension was the most 
salient in President Bush’s decision calculus with the military/strategic dimension also playing a critical role. 
He further points out there was no comprehensive (i.e. search for compensatory trade-offs) evaluation of all 
                                                          
5 See Baron and Spranca (1997), Ritov and Baron (1999), and Tetlock et al. (2000) for a discussion of taboo trade-offs 
and protected values, which correlate to the notions of compensatory and noncompensatory processing. 
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the alternatives and, in fact, it was quite obvious President Bush did not even consider the Do Nothing 
option (ibid., 607). 
In several experimental studies, Mintz and Geva (1997), Mintz, Geva, and Redd (1995), Mintz et al. 
(1997), and Redd (2002) found, among other things, that decision makers tend to employ noncompensatory 
strategies en route to a foreign policy choice. Geva, Redd, and Mintz (2000, 34), also using experimental 
results, found evidence supporting the noncompensatory principle noting “the appearance of a negative 
political value early in the process was sufficient to eliminate that alternative from being chosen.” Finally, 
Mintz (1995), using two Israeli case studies, showed that the noncompensatory principle could be applied to 
theories of coalition formation as well. 
The strength of compensatory models of decision making lies in both the volume of work as well as in 
the diverse methodologies employed by proponents of these models. Both rational actor/expected utility 
(e.g., Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1990) and cybernetic models (e.g., James and Oneal 1991; Ostrom and 
Job 1986) often assume compensatory strategies. Furthermore, the combination of formal modeling, 
empirical analysis and generally correct predictions helps make these studies powerful tools in the study of 
foreign policy decision making. However, as Mintz (1995, 336) states, while these models have greater 
‘outcome validity’ (making correct predictions), they are usually characterized as somewhat deficient in 
‘process validity’ (describing what actually happens). In contrast, experimental and case study approaches of 
the noncompensatory principle of foreign policy decision making have had greater process validity, i.e., they 
actually get at the heart of how decisions are made and how information is processed. 
Satisficing Strategies 
The poliheuristic theory of decision making posits that decision makers ‘satisfice’ rather than ‘maximize’ 
utility (Mintz and Geva 1997; Mintz et al. 1997). Satisficing implies that decision makers stop searching for 
information once they have found a satisfactory alternative. They “seek a satisfactory solution rather than 
attempt to search every nook and cranny of the problem space. Even the expert chess player, for example, 
does not pursue each and every alternative possibility at each choice point, but simply examines a number of 
possibilities that satisfy him/her that s/he is making the correct, or at least best, move” (Sage 1990, 309). This 
satisfactory alternative need not be an optimal one, merely one that satisfies some a priori minimum threshold 
(Monroe 1991; Zey 1992). 
The notion of satisficing was first introduced by Simon (1955, 1957) in his boundedly rational model of 
decision making. The basic argument is that individuals face constraints that limit their computational 
capabilities, their memories and recall abilities, etc. Because of these constraints, individuals develop decision 
procedures that enable them to deal more effectively and decisively with both their own cognitive limitations 
and with the demands imposed by the decision environment (March 1986; Simon 1957). Simon (1957) used 
the term ‘satisficing’ to denote these decision procedures. 
Specifically, a satisficing strategy suggests a process whereby alternatives are considered one at a time, in 
the order they occur in the choice set (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993). The decision maker compares 
alternatives to pre-determined values or thresholds along a selected set of dimensions instead of “evaluating 
each alternative on each dimension and comparing the sum expected utilities of all alternatives” (Mintz and 
Geva 1997, 87). Suedfeld and Tetlock (1992, 67) concur by stating that in the real world, “values, alternatives, 
probabilities, and outcomes are not as clear as is required for ideal decision making. The need to make many 
choices in a short period of time, the complexity of the interactions that determine outcomes, and the 
uncertainty surrounding probabilities, all compel human beings to make their choices by bounded rationality: 
a simplified model of the decision environment.” 
The difference then between maximizing and satisficing decision strategies is that in maximizing decision 
strategies, alternatives are compared to one another and the alternative with the highest utility—however that 
is defined—is chosen. In satsificing decision strategies, alternatives are compared to a threshold, and the first 
alternative to meet or surpass that threshold is selected. The poliheuristic theory stresses satisficing not only 
because it is concerned with finding “acceptable” alternatives instead of maximizing ones, but also because it 
is possible that not all dimensions or alternatives will be considered prior to a decision being made. In an 
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experimental study, Redd (2004) finds evidence to support the proposition that decision makers satisfice, 
rather than maximize, utility under certain conditions. 
PROCESS TRACING METHODS AND 
THE DECISION BOARD PLATFORM 
Process tracing is a methodology designed to help identify and classify decision-making processes. 
Cognitive and social psychological theories are often used in studies of decision making but are not easily 
tested using traditional case studies alone. Moreover, it is not always possible to use standard empirical data 
sets because it is often not possible to explore the important questions and hypotheses using such data sets. 
In the late 1970s, George (1979) advocated process tracing, a method that, until that time, had not been 
rigorously applied in studies of foreign policy decision making. As Mintz et al. (1997, 556) state, “[Process 
tracing’s] main strength is its ability to identify specific strategies used by decision makers and to test 
theoretically derived implications of situational and personal variables on the decision process and its 
outcome.” 
Process tracing directly identifies what information is being accessed to form a judgment and the order in 
which the information is accessed (Ford et al. 1989). This knowledge can then be used to make inferences 
about which decision strategies were employed en route to a choice. Larson (1985) and Khong (1992) used 
process-tracing techniques in studies of the origins of the containment doctrine and on decision making 
during the Vietnam War, respectively (see also Bennett and George 1997 for a more general discussion of 
process-tracing methods in case study research). Experimental process-tracing methods have thus far been 
most often used in studies of voter choice (see e.g., Johnson and Riggle 1994; Lau 1995; Lau and Redlawsk 
1992; Riggle and Johnson 1996; Taber and Steenbergen 1995). Mintz and Geva (1997), Mintz et al. (1997), 
and Redd (2002, 2004) have used process-tracing techniques in studies of foreign policy decision making. 
The Decision Board was developed by Dr. Alex Mintz to facilitate process tracing via a computerized 
system. As shown in Figure 1, the core structure of the Decision Board platform is a matrix of alternatives 
and dimensions on which the alternatives are evaluated (see Mintz et al. 1997). The computerized board 
records key features of the decision-making process. These features are subsequently used to identify decision 
strategies of policy makers.6 A major feature that is recorded is the sequence in which the decision maker 
accesses the information. Version 4.0 of the Decision Board is available at www.decisionboard.org/academic. 
                                                          
6The Decision Board Simulator 4.0 has been used for research, teaching, and training. “It has been used in research to 
test theories of decision making (expected utility, prospect theory, cybernetic theory, poliheuristic theory); to assess the 
effect of framing and affect on decision making; for modeling voting games and electoral campaigns; for process tracing 
of political and economic trends and events; and to understand consumer behavior and choice. It has been used in 
teaching for courses in international relations, public policy and public administration, and management. The board has 
been used at 12 universities, including the University of Connecticut, the University of Michigan; National Defense 
University; University of Canterbury, New Zealand; China Foreign Affairs University in Beijing, China; School of 
Management at Tel Aviv University, Israel; the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee; U.S. Air Force Academy; Yale 
University; and the Program in Foreign Policy Decision Making, and the Institute for Science, Technology and Public 
Policy in the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. Finally, the board has 
been used in training for emergency response decision making, bargaining, negotiation, mediation, and analysis of a 
variety of crisis situations.” (www.decisionboard.org/academic/) 
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Figure 1. Decision Board Platform 
Please remember to select at least one implication and one decision. 
Decision Board Border Crossing Sensors  
Environmental 
Monitors  
Local Emergency 
Responders  Do Nothing   Weight  
Military Dimension   Select   Select   Select   Select   Add  
Economic Dimension   Select   Select   Select   Select   Add  
Political Dimension   Select   Select   Select   Select   Add  
  
Final Choice:       
 
Final Decision
 
A decision problem “typically consists of the selection of an alternative from a set of available 
alternatives. The choice set is evaluated along single or, more typically, multiple dimensions. The ‘values’ in 
the matrix represent the evaluation of a given alternative on a given dimension. These information bins can 
be opened to reveal their contents by the click of a mouse, whereas decisions are made by clicking on the 
choice box of a desired alternative” (Mintz et al. 1997). The computerized Decision Board records (a) the 
sequence in which decision makers acquire the information, (b) the number of items that respondents view 
for every alternative along every dimension, and (c) the amount of time that elapses from the time 
respondents begin the task until they make their choice. Version 4.0 of the Decision Board also displays the 
“decision portraits” of decision makers and calculates holistic versus nonholistic search patterns and 
maximizing versus satisficing decision rules. Using process-tracing techniques, one can identify the strategy 
selection and decision model of leaders and other decision makers. 
For this project, a policy scenario dealing with combating terrorism was used to introduce alternatives 
and dimensions into the Decision Board.7 The scenario stated that the administration was faced with a 
decision about which technologies to pursue in fighting the war on terror. In this scenario, the decision maker 
was presented with four alternatives: 
· Border Crossing Sensors 
· Environmental Monitors 
· Local Emergency Responders 
· Do Nothing 
The dimensions that were employed in the scenario represent decision criteria that were found to be 
relevant in other studies of foreign policy decisions in international relations (see James and Oneal 1991; 
Mintz and Geva 1997; Mintz et al. 1997; Morgan and Bickers 1992; Ostrom and Job 1986). Hence, the 
dimensions included in the Decision Board were as follows: 
· Military 
· Economic 
· Political 
Following the definition of the four alternatives and three dimensions, the values were inserted in the 
decision matrix. These values consisted of a descriptive statement and a summarizing numeric value (on a 
scale from -10 to +10).8 
                                                          
7The experimental task and the decision scenario are described in detail in Appendix A. 
8The decision matrix is presented in its entirety in Appendix B. 
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METHODS 
Subjects 
Forty-six undergraduate students at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee (UWM) and fifty officers at 
National Defense University (NDU) participated in the initial experiment.9 The undergraduate student 
subjects were randomly recruited from several political science courses. The officers were recruited from a 
leadership course taught over two semesters at NDU. Of the officers at NDU, 5 were Captains, 31 were Lt. 
Colonels, 13 were Colonels and 1 was a Brigadier General. These officers represented all four branches of the 
U.S. armed forces and several branches of the Reserve and National Guard. The study used the Decision 
Board platform (Version 4.0) as a “process tracer.” The subjects were randomly assigned to one of four 
experimental conditions. 
Design 
A 2 X 2 between-groups factorial design was employed. The two factors were as follows: (1) Framing of 
likelihood of funding (emphasis on probability of being funded vs. emphasis on probability of not being 
funded), and (2) Certainty effects (certain vs. uncertain that technology will function as designed). 
The Independent and Dependent Variables 
The independent variables consisted of the framing of the likelihood of funding from Congress for the 
new antiterrorism technologies and the degree of certainty that the proposed antiterrorism technologies 
would work as designed as well as process-tracing parameters of decision making such as whether subjects 
used alternative-based or dimension-based strategies, and whether they employed compensatory or non-
compensatory decision rules (Information Acquisition Patterns). The dependent variable in this study consisted of 
the Choices subjects made.10 
The Choices subjects made were categorized as “correct” and “incorrect” choices. Multiplying the 
numerical rating of the alternative by the subject’s rating of a given dimension yielded a weighted rating of the 
alternative along the given dimension. A cumulative “score” of the alternative was then calculated by 
summarizing all the weighted ratings of the alternative along each dimension. If the subject did, in fact, select 
the highest scoring alternative, we coded his/her choice as the “correct” one. 
Measures of alternative vs. dimension-based processing were calculated using Billings and Scherer’s 
(1988) search index. The index ranges from -1 (purely dimensional processing) to +1 (purely alternative- 
based processing). The scoring of subjects’ moves was determined using Billings and Scherer’s (ibid., 10) 
procedure (see Mintz et al. 1997). As in Billings and Scherer (ibid.), shifts were disregarded. The index tallies 
the number of dimensional moves (d), alternative moves (a), and shifts (s), and uses the equation  
I = (a - d)/(a + d) to define the search index. Positive numbers indicate alternative-based moves, while 
negative numbers imply dimensional moves. 
                                                          
9Previous experimental/simulation research in international affairs also used students to test specific decision hypotheses 
(see Beer et al. 1987; Boettcher 1995). Zinnes (1966) replicated World War I decisions in a simulation study using high 
school students. Mintz, Geva, and Redd (1995), using the Foreign Policy Decision Board Platform, obtained similar 
results using both college students and Air Force commanders (see also Mintz et al. 1997). Of course, we are not 
asserting that students operating in an experimental setting equal the high level, real-world context of foreign policy 
decision making. Instead, we are arguing that experimental simulations of these actual, real-world foreign policy settings 
may provide insights into the ways in which uncertainty and framing can influence national security-level decision 
making. See Tetlock (1983) for a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses associated with experimental research in the 
social sciences. 
10Information Acquisition Patterns also appear as dependent variables when testing for the influence of framing and 
uncertainty on decision strategies. They then become independent variables in order to test for the effects of decision 
strategies on choice. 
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The compensatory vs. noncompensatory measure comes from Astorino-Courtois (2000), and her 
measure is based on Payne, Bettman, and Johnson’s (1993) discussion of consistency vs. selectivity in 
information processing (see also Redd 2002). Payne, Bettman, and Johnson (ibid., 30) state “more consistent 
processing across alternatives is indicative of a more compensatory decision strategy” (see also Payne 1976). 
The index for this particular decision matrix ranges from zero, representing complete consistency 
(compensatory processing), to twelve for the CSalt measure, and zero to eight for the CSdim measure, 
indicating maximum selectivity (noncompensatory processing). The Consistency/Selectivity by alternative 
measure is as follows: 
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where n is the number of alternatives in the choice set, and a represents the number of information bins 
accessed per alternative y, z and so on. The Consistency/Selectivity by dimension measure is as follows: 
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where m is the number of dimensions in the choice set, and a is the number of information bins accessed per 
dimension u, w and so on. 
An example (using the decision matrix below) demonstrates how the calculations of the Consistency-
Selectivity measures were done. 
Decision Matrix 
 alternative 
1 
alternative 
2 
alternative 
3 
alternative 
4 
dimension 
A 
1 2 3  
dimension 
B 
8 10    
dimension 
C 
9  4 6 
dimension 
D 
   5 7 
 3 2 3 2 
CSalt = ½ [|(3-2)| + |(3-3)| + |(3-2)| + |(2-3)| + |(2-3)| + |(2-2)| + |(3-3)| + |(3-2)| + |(3-2)| +  
 |(2-3)| + |(2-2)| + |(2-3)|] 
 = ½ [1 + 0 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 0 + 0 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 0 + 1] 
 = ½ [8] 
 = 4 
Examining the scores for alternative 1 we see in the example cited above that the decision maker began 
by accessing information at the nexus of dimension A and alternative 1, then proceeded within dimension A 
to alternative 2 and so forth. Overall, the decision maker accessed three information bins for alternative 1, 
across dimensions A, B and C. Two information bins were accessed for alternative 2, three for alternative 3, 
and two for alternative 4. The CSalt measure yields a score of 4, signifying a fairly consistent search, implying 
the use of a compensatory strategy. In the matrix above, the CSdim measure also leads to a score of 4, again 
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indicating a consistent and compensatory search.11 We also used the noncompensatory measure devised by 
Mintz and Geva (1997) to verify the Astorino-Courtois measure (2000). 
The Research Instrument 
A 4 X 3 (alternatives X dimensions) matrix was implemented. The version used for the experiment was 
developed as an online application. The Decision Board has several advantages: a user-friendly interface, 
multimedia capacity, and the ability to record the cognitive “moves” of decision makers. In this case, the 
Decision Board included twelve information bins, which contained information pertaining to the evaluation 
of a given alternative along a given dimension. The information was presented as an evaluative statement 
followed by a corresponding numerical evaluation. For example, “Using local emergency responders allows 
the military to correlate antiterrorism activities with local communities. This provides for a more 
‘comprehensive’ antiterrorism shield for the United States. I would rate this alternative as 7.” Decision 
makers could open any information bin by clicking on it. Subjects indicated their choices by clicking on a 
choice button underneath the corresponding alternative. Each subject dealt with only one of the four 
following conditions: positive framing-certain technology, positive framing-uncertain technology, negative 
framing-certain technology, and negative framing-uncertain technology. 
Experimental Manipulations 
In order to determine the influence of the importance of advisers and the order of their appearance in 
decision processes and to determine the influence of decision processes on choice, two factors were 
examined. 
Manipulation of Framing 
Subjects in the positive framing condition were told, “At the present time, because of the war on 
terrorism, there is approximately a 90% chance that Congress will fund at least one of these options. 
Congress has committed verbally and in writing to do whatever it takes to protect the American public from 
terrorism.” In contrast, those in the negative framing condition were told, “At the present time, because of 
the recent war in Iraq, there is approximately a 10% chance that Congress will not fund any of these options. 
Congress may be constrained in its spending because of a weak domestic economy and the ongoing war in 
Iraq and the cost of the war approaching $100 billion.”  
Manipulation of Certainty 
Subjects in the certain condition were told, “At this stage there is a high level of certainty that these 
future technologies will be successful and will work as conceived of and designed. Many in the scientific 
community are encouraged by the progress made so far and are hopeful that these options and the 
technology associated with them will actually work.” In contrast, those in the uncertain condition were told, 
“At this stage there is a high level of uncertainty about whether these future technologies will be successful 
and will work as conceived of and designed. Many in the scientific community are skeptical about the 
progress made so far and doubt that these options and the technology associated with them will actually 
work.” 
Since many policy decisions are made under time and informational constraints, all of the subjects were 
subjected to time pressure in order to increase the “mundane reality” (Aronson and Carlsmith 1968). The 
experimental manipulation consisted of instructions indicating that there was a time constraint. However, the 
subjects were not actually restricted in the amount of time available. 
                                                          
11It is possible to end up with different scores for the CSalt and CSdim measures depending on the search pattern of the 
decision maker. 
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Procedure 
Two samples were chosen to examine the decision making processing activity—real-world decision 
makers represented by officers participating in the leadership program at NDU and undergraduate student 
decision makers at a major state university. The students provide a comparison and control for the NDU 
sample. The undergraduate students were administered the online experiment in a computer lab at the 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and the NDU attendees were tested online via the National Defense 
University. Each subject operated individually on a computer. The instructions and decision scenarios were 
displayed on the computer screen. Subjects were informed that they would be presented with a specific 
scenario concerning various technologies being developed to combat terrorism and with a decision matrix 
containing alternatives and the evaluations of those alternatives along three different dimensions: military, 
economic, and political. The subjects were instructed to make the best choice among the available options. 
Following the policy decision, a post-decision questionnaire was administered, followed by a detailed 
debriefing. 
RESULTS 
The data analysis focused on determining how the framing (the likelihood of funding antiterrorism 
measures from Congress) and the degree of certainty (the functionality of these antiterrorism measures) 
influenced strategy selection and choice, as well as how decision processes themselves affected choice. We 
first present significant results from the experiments with student subjects. These will form a baseline with 
which results from the more experienced NDU can be compared.  
Framing, Certainty, Strategy Selection, and Choice 
Before reporting the detailed results for the two types of subjects, it is important to note that the 
manipulations for framing and certainty affected choices in both subject populations. Using Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) methods, for the student subjects the framing manipulation was significant F(1, 41) = 
7.43 p < .009, positive frame (M = 8.00), negative frame (M = 6.27) (ANOVA utilizes an F-test and “M” 
refers to the means for the corresponding conditions). The certainty manipulation for the student subjects 
was also significant F(1, 41) = 10.19 p < .003, certain (M = 5.86), uncertain (M = 3.57). For the military 
subjects, the framing manipulation was significant F(1, 45) = 7.42 p < .009, positive frame (M = 8.12), 
negative frame (M = 6.50). The certainty manipulation for the military subjects was also significant F(1, 45) = 
7.63 p < .008, certain (M = 6.56), uncertain (M = 4.75). In other words, subjects responded to the 
manipulations imposed by the researchers, meaning that any significant results can be attributed to the 
researchers’ manipulations of the independent variables. 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee (UWM) Student Subjects 
Using ANOVA methods and the Search Index (SI), we found a close to conventionally significant result 
F (1, 42) = 3.44 p < .07 for the certainty manipulation. When presented with certainty, subjects used more 
alternative-based procedures (M = .415) than when presented with uncertainty (M = -.010). In the uncertainty 
situation, subjects operated in a more dimension-based fashion. This suggests that when UWM student 
subjects were faced with the perhaps more cognitively demanding uncertain conditions they tended to resort 
to dimension-based strategies, which have been shown to help alleviate cognitive strain (Russo and Dosher 
1983). 
We also tested for the influence of certainty and framing on participants’ likelihood of making the 
“correct” choice. As stated earlier, multiplying the numerical rating of the alternative by the subject’s rating of 
a given dimension identified the “correct” choice. Each alternative then had a cumulative “score,” and we 
subsequently coded whether the subject did, in fact, select the highest scoring alternative. Using the z test for 
proportions (Langer and Abelson 1972) we found a main effect for certainty (z = 2.67 p < .005). Table 1 
shows that when student subjects were faced with certain technology, they made the “correct” choice only 
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20% of the time, but when they were faced with uncertainty, they made the correct choice 57% of the time. 
Our explanation for this finding is that the students had a preference over preference (a priori bias toward the 
selection of a particular alternative) to Do Nothing in this case, so the certainty/uncertainty manipulation did 
not influence their choices in a meaningful way. 
Table 1. Effect of Certainty on Choice 
(University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Student Subjects) 
Certainty 
Certainty Uncertainty 
20% 57% 
We also used a different definition for “correct” choice, simply labeling the Do Nothing alternative as the 
“best” choice because it had the highest cumulative score. Again using the z test for proportions we found 
significant results for the effect of framing and the use of maximizing versus satisficing strategies on correct 
choice. We found a main effect for framing (z = 1.82 p < .05), with Table 2 showing that 54% of those 
exposed to a positive frame made the “best” choice while only 30% of those exposed to a negative frame did 
so. This result is somewhat counterintuitive since in the positive frame the three antiterrorism technologies 
were framed positively, i.e., Congress would fund them. Again, the students’ preference over preference led 
them to choose the Do Nothing (correct choice) option even though the other options were framed 
positively. 
Table 2. Effect of Framing on Choice as a Function of Maximizing vs. Satisficing Strategies 
(University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Student Subjects) 
Framing 
Positive Negative 
54% 30% 
We also found a significant effect for the certainty manipulation on subjects’ propensity to maximize 
versus satisfice. Using a chi-square test (c2 = 5.84 p < .02) we found that participants faced with certain 
technology used a maximizing strategy only 22% of the time, while those faced with uncertainty maximized 
57% of the time (see Table 3). In other words, student subjects responded to the uncertainty of the 
antiterrorism technology by maximizing their search for information. 
Table 3. Effect of Certainty on Decision Strategy 
(University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Student Subjects) 
Maximizing Decision Strategy 
Certainty Uncertainty 
22% 57% 
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Several significant results were generated by examining the influence of the two manipulated independent 
variables on participants’ use of compensatory versus noncompensatory strategies.12 Using the z test for 
proportions we found a significant main effect for framing and noncompensatory processing (see Tables 4-6). 
Specifically, we found two main effects and an interaction effect. In the main effect for framing (z = 3.05 p < 
.003), 46% of the subjects faced with a positive frame chose the “correct” option whereas only 15% of those 
faced with a negative frame did so. The main effect for decision strategy (z = 1.66 p < .05) shows that 36% of 
those subjects employing a compensatory strategy were able to make the correct choice while only 25% of 
those using a noncompensatory strategy were able to do so. The interaction effect (z = 2.27 p < .02) shows 
that no one faced with a negative frame and using noncompensatory strategies was able to make the correct 
choice. Again, these findings show that even though the three antiterrorism technologies were framed 
positively and subjects used compensatory strategies, students’ preferences led them to choose the Do 
Nothing option. 
Table 4. Effect of Framing on Choice in the Context of Noncompensatory 
vs. Compensatory Processing 
(University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Student Subjects) 
Framing 
Positive Negative 
46% 15% 
Table 5. Effect of Decision Strategy on Choice in the Context of Framing 
(University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Student Subjects) 
Decision Strategy 
Compensatory Noncompensatory 
36% 25% 
Table 6. Effect of Framing and Decision Strategy on Choice 
(University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Student Subjects) 
Framing 
Decision Strategy Positive Negative 
Compensatory 41% 30% 
Noncompensatory 50% 0% 
 
                                                          
12 We present results only for the CSdim measure. 
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We also found two significant results for certainty and noncompensatory strategies (see Tables 7 and 8). 
We found a main effect for certainty (z = 2.71 p < .005) wherein only 14% of those faced with certainty were 
able to make the correct choice while 39% faced with uncertainty were able to do so. The main effect for 
decision strategy (z = 2.27 p < .02) shows that 36% of those subjects using compensatory strategies were able 
to make the correct choice while only 17% using noncompensatory strategies were able to do so. These 
results are similar to those reported in Tables 3 and 5. 
Table 7. Effect of Certainty on Choice in the Context of Noncompensatory vs. Compensatory 
(University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Student Subjects) 
Certainty 
Certainty Uncertainty 
14% 39% 
Table 8. Effect of Decision Strategy on Choice in the Context of Certainty 
(University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Student Subjects) 
Decision Strategy 
Compensatory Noncompensatory 
36% 17% 
National Defense University (NDU) Military Subjects 
Generally speaking, results from the military subjects stand in contrast to those from the less experienced 
undergraduate subjects. Using ANOVA methods and the Search Index (SI), we found a significant result F(1, 
46) = 6.56 p < .01 for the certainty manipulation. However, the results were in the opposite direction from 
those of the student subjects. When presented with certainty, NDU subjects used more dimension-based 
procedures (M = -.165) than when presented with uncertainty (M = .418). Under conditions of uncertainty 
they operated in a more alternative-based fashion. It seems that when facing uncertainty with respect to the 
operation of the antiterrorism technologies, the military subjects decided to gather more information about 
these technologies by processing information about each alternative in an alternative-based fashion. When 
told the technologies were certain to succeed, subjects judged them on political, economic, and military 
merits. 
Using the z test for proportions we also found a significant interaction effect between framing and the 
decision strategy used, i.e., alternative versus dimension-based procedures, and subjects making the “correct” 
choice (defined as the Do Nothing option) (z = 2.48 p < .01). Subjects facing a negative frame and using 
alternative-based procedures and a positive frame and dimension-based procedures were unable to make the 
correct choice (see Table 9). The total percentages are quite low here because very few of the military subjects 
chose the Do Nothing option. We also found a main effect for certainty and correct choice (z = 2.58 p < 
.005). Specifically, subjects faced with certainty were unable to make the correct choice (0%) while those 
faced with uncertainty made the correct choice 14% of the time (see Table 10). This finding is in line with 
previous effects of certainty on choice for student subjects. 
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Table 9. Effect of Framing and Decision Strategy on Choice 
(National Defense University Military Subjects) 
Framing 
Decision Strategy Positive Negative 
Alternative-based 10% 0% 
Dimension-based 0% 14% 
Table 10. Effect of Certainty on Choice in the Context of Alternative 
vs. Dimension-Based Strategies 
(National Defense University Military Subjects) 
Certainty 
Certainty Uncertainty 
0% 14% 
Defining “correct” choice as multiplying the numerical rating of the alternative by the subject’s own 
rating of a given dimension, we found several other significant relationships between the manipulated 
independent variables and choice as a function of decision strategy. We found a main effect for framing (z = 
2.97 p < .003) wherein those faced with a positive frame, regardless of compensatory or noncompensatory 
processing, made the correct choice 38% of the time while those in the negative frame only did so 11% of the 
time (see Table 11). These findings are similar to those reported with student subjects and demonstrated in 
Table 4. We also found an interaction effect between decision strategy and framing (z = 2.56 p < .01) wherein 
those faced with a negative frame and using noncompensatory strategies were not able to choose correctly 
(0%) (see Table 12). These findings are in line with those reported in Table 6 for the student subjects; 
although, the dependent variable was defined slightly differently. 
Table 11. Effect of Framing on Choice in the Context of Noncompensatory 
vs. Compensatory Processing 
(National Defense University Military Subjects) 
Framing 
Positive Negative 
38% 11% 
Table 12. Effect of Framing and Decision Strategy on Choice 
(National Defense University Military Subjects) 
Framing 
Decision Strategy Positive Negative 
Compensatory 26% 21% 
Noncompensatory 50% 0% 
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Using the same definition of correct choice we also found a relationship between certainty, decision 
strategy and choice. We found a main effect for certainty (z = 2.56 p < .01) wherein those faced with certain 
technology made the correct choice 36% of the time while those faced with uncertainty did so only 13% of 
the time (see Table 13). We also found an interaction effect between decision strategy and certainty (z = 2.97 
p < .003) wherein those faced with uncertainty and using noncompensatory strategies did not choose 
correctly (0%) (see Table 14). In both cases, military subjects were more likely than UWM students to make 
the correct choice when faced with certainty. Again, this may be a function of the military subjects having a 
preference over preference for “doing something,” i.e., choosing any option but the Do Nothing alternative. 
Table 13. Effect of Certainty on Choice in the Context of Noncompensatory 
vs. Compensatory Processing 
(National Defense University Military Subjects) 
Certainty 
Certainty Uncertainty 
36% 13% 
Table 14. Effect of Certainty and Decision Strategy on Choice 
(National Defense University Military Subjects) 
Certainty 
Decision Strategy Certainty Uncertainty 
Compensatory 21% 26% 
Noncompensatory 50% 0% 
UWM Student-NDU Military Subject Comparison 
We compared student subject responses with NDU subject responses and generated the following 
results. First we compared student subjects’ and NDU subjects’ decisions to choose the Do Nothing 
response versus choosing one of the other options. Using a difference of proportions test for two different 
subject pools (z test) we found a significant difference between the two subject pools (z = 3.13 p < .001). A 
full 34% of the student subjects chose the Do Nothing option while 66% chose one of the other three 
alternatives, whereas only 8% of the NDU subjects chose the Do Nothing option and 92% chose one of the 
other options (see Table 15). This is a very interesting finding. If we consider the military subjects to be more 
experienced in what is essentially a budgeting decision, then we would naturally expect them to choose one of 
the three antiterrorism technologies knowing that it is better to opt for something than to do nothing. 
Conversely, student subjects, operating in more of a policy void, would be more likely to favor doing nothing 
over any other alternative. 
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Table 15. Differences Between University of UWM Student Subjects and 
NDU Military Subjects Choosing Do Nothing vs. Do Something Decision Strategies 
Choice 
Subject Group Do Nothing Do Something 
UWM Student Subjects 34% 66% 
NDU Military Subjects 8% 92% 
We also compared the differences in choices of decision strategies using the same method. We found a 
significant difference between the two groups in their use of maximizing versus satisficing strategies in the 
two groups (z = 2.39 p < .01). We found that 40% of the student subjects chose a maximizing strategy while 
60% chose a satisficing strategy. In contrast, only 18% of the NDU subjects chose a maximizing strategy and 
82% chose to satisfice (see Table 16). It would appear that greater experience and familiarity with the general 
problem area encourages a more realistic, compromise position among the military subjects. Since military 
subjects are more likely to be familiar with issues related to antiterrorism in particular and have more 
experience generally in making decisions, they would tend to satisfice, i.e., make the choice that is “good 
enough” rather than maximizing, i.e., attempting to make the “best” decision. 
Table 16. Differences Between University of UWM Student Subjects and 
NDU Military Subjects Choosing Maximizing vs. Satisficing Decision Strategies 
Decision Strategy 
Subject Group Maximizing Satisficing 
UWM Student Subjects 40% 60% 
NDU Military Subjects 18% 82% 
We also found a significant difference between the UWM students and NDU officers in their choices of 
compensatory versus noncompensatory processing by alternative (z = 2.36 p < .01). Only 15% of the student 
subjects chose a noncompensatory strategy (85% chose a compensatory strategy) while 36% of the NDU 
military subjects chose a noncompensatory strategy (64% selected a compensatory strategy) (see Table 17). 
Once again, this would imply that NDU officers resorted to the use of cognitive shortcuts to a greater degree 
than did their student counterparts. This is further evidence of more experienced decision makers who tend 
to resort to strategies that alleviate cognitive strain. 
Table 17. Differences Between University of UWM Student Subjects and 
NDU Military Subjects Choosing Compensatory vs. Noncompensatory Decision Strategies 
Decision Strategy 
Subject Group Compensatory Noncompensatory 
UWM Student Subjects 85% 15% 
NDU Military Subjects 64% 36% 
 
research findings & conclusions 
Decision Making Under Conditions of Uncertainty: Experimental Assessment of Decision Models 21 
Research Supported by the National Defense University, Contract No. DABJ29-03-P-0084 
Institute for Science, Technology and Public Policy, George Bush School of Government and Public Service 
Texas A&M University 
We also analyzed differences between the two groups in the number of information bins accessed. The 
two groups differed in the overall number of cells accessed F(1, 94) = 14.55 p < .0002. The UWM students 
accessed more cells (M = 11.30) compared to their NDU military counterparts (M = 9.04). There were also 
significant differences as a function of condition. Under the condition of positive framing, the difference was 
significant F(1, 47) = 6.82 p < .01, where the UWM students again accessed more information (M = 11.33) 
compared to the military subjects (M = 9.24). Under negative framing F(1, 45) = 7.39 p < .009, UWM 
students opened more information bins (M = 11.27) than NDU military subjects (M = 8.84). Similar results 
were obtained for the certainty F(1, 47) = 9.88 p < .003, UWM subjects (M = 11.57), NDU subjects (M = 
9.12) and uncertainty F(1, 45) = 5.20 p < .03, UWM subjects (M = 11.04), NDU subjects (M = 8.96) 
conditions. Again, the more experienced military decision makers needed less information before making a 
choice and these results held overall as well as for the different conditions of framing and certainty. 
We also compared the choices of the two groups for the four different options. Using a chi-square test 
we found significant differences between the two groups (c2 = 12.11 p < .01). Specifically, we found that 
military subjects were more likely to select the Border Crossing Sensors alternative while student subjects 
were more likely to choose the Do Nothing option (see Table 18). As we reported above, military subjects 
favored doing something as opposed to doing nothing. 
Table 18. Differences Between University of UWM Student Subjects and 
NDU Military Subjects Choosing Among Four Options 
Choice 
Subject Group Border Crossing 
Sensors 
Environmental 
Monitors 
Local Emergency 
Responders 
Do 
Nothing 
UWM Student Subjects 15 (34%) 3 (7%) 12 (26%) 16 (35%) 
NDU Military Subjects 30 (58%) 3 (6%) 13 (26%) 4 (9%) 
CONCLUSIONS 
We analyzed how uncertainty and the framing of options affects decision makers’ responses and choices 
with respect to policy options dealing with anti-terrorism technologies. We did so in an experimental setting 
using an online version of the Decision Board Platform with two different subject populations: student 
subjects and military commanders. 
Our results show that uncertainty affects decision makers’ selection of decision strategies. However, 
uncertainty affected our two subject pools in opposite ways: student subjects responded to uncertainty with 
more dimension-based processing while the military commanders employed alternative-based procedures 
when faced with uncertainty. The student subjects also tended to use maximizing strategies more often than 
did their military counterparts, who tended to satisfice. In contrast to the NDU subjects, UWM student 
subjects also tended to access more information en route to their choices. 
Uncertainty also affected subjects’ choices. Interestingly, uncertainty generally led to higher proportions 
of subjects making the “correct” decision in both subject pools. (Following decision theory conventions, a 
“correct” choice was defined as the choice alternative with the highest cumulative ratings by the subject along 
each dimension.) The major exception occurred for the military subjects when they were also employing 
noncompensatory strategies. Noncompensatory strategies are those that do not recognize trade-offs, or 
acceptable alternatives to a preferred attribute. When noncompensatory strategies were used, certainty aided 
the military subjects in choosing “correctly.” Framing affected choice as well. In general, positive framing led 
to a greater likelihood of participants making the correct choice. 
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There were also marked differences in the two subject pools in processing information and in making 
choices. As mentioned above, many students tended to maximize ( or search alternatives until the optimal 
one is found) while military commanders tended to satisfice (or search until an alternative that satisfies some 
minimal threshold is found). Also, students gathered more information than their military counterparts en 
route to choice. Military commanders were very reluctant to choose the Do Nothing option (8%), while 
student subjects were much more likely to do so (34%). The military commanders overwhelmingly favored 
the Border Crossing Sensors option while the student subjects were more evenly split between Border 
Crossing Sensors and the Do Nothing options. 
Our research findings convey some important messages and applied lessons about how uncertainty and 
framing of scientific and technological information may influence decision processes and outcomes. The first, 
and perhaps the most important, lesson we learned from this study is that in real decision situations, 
uncertainty about technological innovations is not necessarily undesirable as officers tended to seek more 
information about the technologies when faced with uncertain choices. Uncertainty is a common 
characteristic of real decision making processes, and all complex science and technological issues involve 
some degree of uncertainty. Our study shows that greater uncertainty about new anti-terrorism technologies 
generally leads to a greater likelihood of subjects making the “correct” decision in both subject pools. The 
general implication of the findings on the effects of uncertainty is that, in the case of experienced decision 
makers, when more information is thought to be essential for making good decisions, learning tools that 
stress the uncertainty of the issue and allow for the access of more information are more likely to lead to the 
use of alternative-based information search strategies and the accessing of more information before decisions 
are made.  
When constructing decision tools, two things should be kept in mind: (1) for policy decision makers, it is 
important to keep in mind that the uncertainty problem lies at the very heart of all complex science and 
technology issues. It is helpful to seek skeptical perspectives and alternative courses of action when facing 
such a complex decision situation; (2) it is the duty of policy analysts, experts, and advisors to inform decision 
makers of both certainties and the limits of knowledge, the positive and negative consequences as well as the 
strengths and weaknesses of each option. Even if the certainty about a technological innovation is high, being 
aware and cautious about the complexity and uncertain aspects of the new technology may contribute to 
quality decision choices. 
The second important lesson learned here is that different framing of the same decision problem do 
affect decision process and choice outcomes, even for seasoned decision makers. This finding is consistent 
with previous experimental studies on framing effects (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). The ways decision 
problems are framed are not always thought through carefully. Administrators, experts and advisors should 
be aware that the same decisional situation can be framed in different ways and that the different frames of 
the same decision problems can lead to different choices. Special training and experimentation with multiple 
frames and deep analysis on possible choice outcomes may make decision makers more aware of the general 
tendency to be influenced by the way information is presented. Training on frames should help trainees 
understand how various framing formats operate on decision making , help them avoid frame traps, mater 
framing and reframing techniques, and enhance multiple-frame management skills. 
The third important lesson learned is that regardless of certainty or uncertainty and positive vs. negative 
framing, experienced decision makers, such as the military officers at National Defense University, are more 
likely to choose “doing something” even when “doing nothing” is an option and, in fact, even when “doing 
nothing” is the highest rated option. The NDU group was significantly more likely than the UWM group to 
choose this option (66% of UWM subjects and 92% of NDU subjects preferred to “do something.”). This 
finding may have been a function of the fact that the decision set before the subjects was basically a 
budgeting decision, and experienced decision makers “never leave money on the table.” It may also have been 
a function of the belief that in the war on terrorism, it is better to pursue some solution than to put off 
making a decision for the foreseeable future. The preference over preference (in this case for action over 
inaction) tendency may also be a function of NDU subjects’ military experience and training backgrounds. 
Compared to non-military subjects (i.e. UWM students), military officers have more training and experience 
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in taking action and making quick decisions. “Doing nothing” may seem like a less acceptable option, even if 
it is presented in the choice set and in fact rated as the highest desirable option. Whatever the source of this 
tendency, military programs may need to pay more attention to this action orientation and minimize risk of 
only making action-based choices when sometimes, “doing nothing” is actually the best option.  
The fourth significant lesson is about decision theory itself. Previously, rational choice theory –the 
expected utility model for example – has generally dominated decision making analysis and been widely used 
in various education and training programs in the fields of risk management, conflict resolution, leadership, 
foreign policy analysis, strategic planning, and political decision making. Our study shows that as an emerging 
theoretical framework – the poliheuristic decision theory - may represent a viable alternative theoretical 
framework to the existing decision models. The poliheuristic theory embodies fundamental elements of both 
rational and cognitive decision models and incorporates the conditions surrounding policy decisions, as well 
as the rational and cognitive processing characteristics associated with these surroundings. As shown in our 
study, real-world decision processes and outcomes appear to be more compatible with the poliheuristic 
propositions and explanations than with those derived from a strict rational choice model. As a more realistic 
decision model, the poliheuristic theory of decision making should be considered for designing future 
courses, projects and training programs. 
The last lesson that can be summarized here is the potential of the Decision Board as a training and 
support tool for decision making on complex choice situations involving uncertainty, limited information and 
potential framing effects. The core structure of the Decision Board is a matrix of alternative and evaluation 
dimensions which reflect that fundamental construct of all decision problems. The computerized Decision 
Board has several advantages. First, it can be used to configure an unstructured, complicated decision 
problem into a relatively well-organized and cognitively manageable decision matrix. Second, it can be used to 
facilitate the process of identifying critical information, available options, and major attribute dimensions. 
Third, with the assistance of process-tracing techniques, it can be used to record the sequence in which 
decision makers acquire relevant information and the amount of time that elapses from the time respondents 
begin the task until they make their final choice. Finally, because the Decision Board is a computerized 
process-tracing program it allows varying experimental designs and manipulations to identify the influence of 
certain variables such as uncertainty and framing, on the processing characteristics, decision strategies and 
choice outcomes. 
Future work should further explore the important issues we examined in this study. Replication of these 
experiments should shed more light on the validity of the results and garner additional information on the 
ways in which experienced decision makers reach their conclusions. This study indicated that uncertainty 
encourages more thorough information searches among experienced decision makers, and this is a finding 
that warrants further exploration. For example, thresholds of uncertainty may alter this relationship as may a 
number of other factors such as familiarity and immediacy. The finding that experienced decision makers are 
influenced by even the relatively straightforward framing used in this study also warrants further exploration 
and suggests additional training on frames may be called for. Other important factors such as accountability, 
ambiguity, familiarity, and information availability are but a few of the possible independent variables that can 
be examined in the context of decision making in the war on terror and other issues. With specific reference 
to antiterrorism technology, work can also be done to examine the public’s reaction to the possible 
deployment and use of these antiterrorism technologies under the condition of uncertainty and framing 
differences. 
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The Scenario 
Administration Decision: Combating Terrorism 
During the past several weeks the media has focused heavily on the Administration’s upcoming decision 
regarding its choice whether to pursue various advanced technologies aimed at combating terrorism in the 
future. Since the events of September 11, 2001, the Administration has been undertaking steps to detect and 
combat terrorists and terrorist acts committed here in the United States. The Administration, in cooperation 
with various research centers and laboratories, has been looking to develop several new futuristic advanced 
technologies designed to detect weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 
However, not all of the technologies can be implemented in the future. A choice must be made. As a 
chief Administration official, you must decide what to do. The decision has military, economic, and political 
implications. The military dimension deals with how the proposed technologies would aid the armed services 
in dealing with potential uses of WMD on American soil. The economic dimension addresses the total costs 
of each technology in terms of research and development as well as implementation. The political dimension 
deals with how your choice of the new technology will be received by Congress and the American public. 
At the present time, because of the war on terrorism, there is approximately a 90% chance that Congress 
will fund at least one of these options. Congress has committed verbally and in writing to do whatever it takes 
to protect the American public from terrorism.1 
The following alternatives have been identified: 
· Border Crossing Sensors: Introduce environmental monitors that can trace whether chemical 
or biological weapons have been set off. Using EPA monitoring stations, these monitors 
sample the air for traces of chemical and biological toxins. 
· Environmental Monitors: Introduce sensors that can be used at border crossings in order to 
detect whether terrorists are attempting to smuggle chemical or biological weapons into 
the country. 
· Local Emergency Responders: Provide local emergency responders with radiological detection 
equipment. 
· Do Nothing: Decide not to proceed with implementing any particular system at this time. 
At this stage there is a high level of certainty that these future technologies will be successful and will 
work as conceived of and designed. Many in the scientific community are encouraged by the progress made 
so far and are hopeful that these options and the technology associated with them will actually work.2 
The decision board will indicate how each of these options is evaluated along various relevant 
dimensions. These written evaluations are also summarized as a rating on a 21-point scale (-10 implies that an 
option is evaluated very unfavorably, 0 implies a neutral position, and 10 implies a very favorable evaluation 
of the option). 
                                                          
1 Negative frame reads as follows: At the present time, because of the recent war in Iraq, there is approximately a 10% 
chance that Congress will not fund any of these options. Congress may be constrained in its spending because of a weak 
domestic economy and the ongoing war in Iraq and the cost of the war approaching $100 billion. 
2 Uncertainty manipulation reads as follows: At this stage there is a high level of uncertainty about whether these future 
technologies will be successful and will work as conceived of and designed. Many in the scientific community are 
skeptical about the progress made so far and doubt that these options and the technology associated with them will 
actually work. 
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A decision has to be made! Please begin the computer simulation to explore the evaluations of the 
alternatives along the various dimensions and then determine your choice. 
As with all "real-life" decisions, there is a tradeoff between the amount of information you consider and 
the time it takes you to make a decision based on that information. 
Taking too much time to review the evaluations may be costly. Remember that you can only access a 
particular "box" of information once.  
Press “CONTINUE” to start the decision process. 
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Decision Matrix for the Administration Decision 
Alternatives 
Dimension 
Border Crossing 
Sensors 
Environmental 
Monitors 
Local Emergency 
Responders Do Nothing 
“Deploying sensors at 
border crossings is a 
positive step in the 
prevention of 
terrorism in the United 
States. This also 
provides the military 
with a concrete 
location in which to 
concentrate its 
antiterrorism 
activities.” 
“Deploying 
environmental monitors 
could help in the 
detection of terrorist 
activity; however, simply 
‘monitoring’ the release 
of chemical/biological 
toxins may be too little, 
too late. The military 
tends to favor 
‘preventing’ terrorist 
activities, rather than 
simply detecting them.” 
“Using local 
emergency responders 
allows the military to 
correlate antiterrorism 
activities with local 
communities. This 
provides for a more 
‘comprehensive’ 
antiterrorism shield for 
the United States.” 
“Doing nothing in 
this case is unwise. 
The military must 
prepare now to 
address the possible 
threat of terrorist 
action here in the 
United States. If we 
fail to act now we 
will be subjecting 
the United States to 
a grave security 
threat.” 
Military 
I would rate this 
alternative as: 
4 
I would rate this 
alternative as: 
1 
I would rate this 
alternative as: 
7 
I would rate this 
alternative as: 
-8 
“This option would 
most likely be cost 
prohibitive. The U.S. 
has long borders with 
both Mexico and 
Canada and trying to 
cover the thousands of 
miles with each is more 
than we can afford.” 
“Deploying 
environmental monitors 
throughout the United 
States in most major 
cities would be entirely 
too expensive, running 
into the billions and 
billions of dollars.” 
“This option is more 
cost effective since 
local communities and 
actors could help bear 
the cost of fighting the 
war on terrorism.” 
“From an economic 
standpoint this is 
the best option. 
Economic resources 
would be better 
spent in targeting 
terrorists in their 
overseas locations.” 
Economic 
I would rate this 
alternative as: 
-4 
I would rate this 
alternative as: 
-8 
I would rate this 
alternative as: 
3 
I would rate this 
alternative as: 
10 
“Protecting our 
borders is a very visual 
sign of the war on 
terror and will make 
U.S. citizens feel 
safer.” 
“This will show that the 
U.S. is seriously 
committed to the war on 
terrorism. Environmental 
monitors show the public 
that we will do whatever 
it takes to protect our 
people.” 
“This option will not 
be looked upon 
favorably by local 
governments since 
they will have to 
contribute resources to 
the war on terror. 
Likewise, this may put 
undue burdens on the 
public within their 
local communities.” 
“A case can also be 
made to the public 
for doing nothing at 
this time. The other 
three technology 
options are 
unproven and 
untried on a nation-
wide scale at this 
point in time and 
the public may 
prefer to take the 
wait-and-see 
approach.” 
Political 
I would rate this 
alternative as: 
5 
I would rate this 
alternative as: 
9 
I would rate this 
alternative as: 
-5 
I would rate this 
alternative as: 
8 
Appendix B  
Decision Making Under Conditions of Uncertainty: Experimental Assessment of Decision Models 36 
Research Supported by the National Defense University, Contract No. DABJ29-03-P-0084 
Institute for Science, Technology and Public Policy, George Bush School of Government and Public Service 
Texas A&M University 
Appendix C 
Decision Making Under Conditions of Uncertainty: Experimental Assessment of Decision Models 37 
Research Supported by the National Defense University, Contract No. DABJ29-03-P-0084 
Institute for Science, Technology and Public Policy, George Bush School of Government and Public Service 
Texas A&M University 
Appendix C
  
  38 
  
  
  
 
 
 
Appendix C  
Decision Making Under Conditions of Uncertainty: Experimental Assessment of Decision Models 39 
Research Supported by the National Defense University, Contract No. DABJ29-03-P-0084 
Institute for Science, Technology and Public Policy, George Bush School of Government and Public Service 
Texas A&M University 
Decision Making Under Conditions of Uncertainty: 
Experimental Assessment of Decision Models¾ 
Follow-up Experimental Analysis 
 Steven B. Redd Mark Davis 
 Department of Political Science National Defense University 
 University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee 
 
 
  
  40 
  
  
  
Appendix C 
Decision Making Under Conditions of Uncertainty: Experimental Assessment of Decision Models 41 
Research Supported by the National Defense University, Contract No. DABJ29-03-P-0084 
Institute for Science, Technology and Public Policy, George Bush School of Government and Public Service 
Texas A&M University 
METHODS 
Subjects 
Thirty-three officers at National Defense University (NDU) participated in the second phase of the 
experiment.1 The officers were recruited from a leadership course taught over two semesters at NDU and 
were some of the same officers who participated in the first phase of the experiment. These officers 
represented all four branches of the U.S. armed forces, and several branches of the Reserve and National 
Guard. The study used the decision board platform (Version 4.0) as a “process tracer.” The subjects were 
randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions. 
Design 
As in the original study, a 2 X 2 between-groups factorial design was employed. The two factors were as 
follows: (1) Framing of likelihood of funding (positive vs. negative), and (2) Certainty effects (certain that 
technology will function vs. uncertain). 
The primary goal of this analysis was to determine if and how NDU military subjects change decision 
strategies and choices as a consequence of leadership courses taken at the National Defense University. Three 
notes of importance: (1) the second phase analysis was not designed as a within-subjects design, i.e., subjects 
did not participate in the exact same conditions in phases one and two, but were instead randomly assigned in 
the second phase to one of the four conditions; (2) not all of the original 53 respondents in phase one 
participated in phase two, wherein 33 subjects participated, and (3) one of the conditions in phase two had 
only 5 subjects; therefore, any conclusions regarding the specific results for phase two or for the comparisons 
between phases one and two should be considered tentative. This second phase of the examination of NDU 
military subjects did yield several interesting results. 
RESULTS 
As was the case in the original study, the data analysis focused on determining how the framing of the 
likelihood of funding antiterrorism measures from Congress and the degree of certainty concerning the 
functionality of these antiterrorism measures influenced strategy selection and choice, as well as how decision 
processes themselves affected choice. This second phase of the study also concentrated on comparing any 
differences between the first phase of those participating in the study at the National Defense University with 
those participating in the second phase. 
Framing, Certainty, Strategy Selection, and Choice 
We present significant results concerning first, the second phase of the NDU subjects, and second, the 
comparisons between the first and second subject pools at the National Defense University. Before doing so 
it is important to note that the manipulations for framing and certainty did not work in the second phase of 
the experiment. For the military subjects in the second phase, the framing manipulation was not significant 
F(1, 29) = 1.24 p < .274, positive frame (M = 7.84), negative frame (M = 6.79). The certainty manipulation 
for the military subjects was also not significant F(1, 29) = .782 p < .384, certain (M = 7.00), uncertain (M = 
                                                          
1Previous experimental/simulation research in international affairs also used students to test specific decision hypotheses 
(see Beer et al. 1987; Boettcher 1995). Zinnes (1966) replicated World War I decisions in a simulation study using high 
school students. Mintz, Geva, and Redd (1995), using the Foreign Policy Decision Board Platform, obtained similar 
results using both college students and Air Force commanders (see also Mintz et al. 1997). Of course, we are not 
asserting that students operating in an experimental setting equal the high level, real-world context of foreign policy 
decision making. Instead, we are arguing that experimental simulations of these actual, real-world foreign policy settings 
can provide insights into the ways in which advisers can influence national security-level decision making. See Tetlock 
(1983) for a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses associated with experimental research in the social sciences. 
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5.78). The means were in the right direction but not statistically significantly different. We would add the 
caveat that one of the conditions only had five participants so the results could be a function of this rather 
low count. 
NDU Military Subjects: Second Phase 
Using ANOVA methods and the Search Index (SI), we found no significant effects of framing or 
certainty on the use of alternative or dimension-based strategies. However, in contrast to the first phase, we 
did find marginally significant results for noncompensatory strategies by alternative and for the number of 
cells accessed. We found a main effect for certainty on the use of noncompensatory strategies F(1, 29) = 3.06 
p < .09. Faced with certain technology, subjects tended to use more noncompensatory strategies (M = 4.33) 
while those faced with uncertainty used more compensatory strategies (M = 2.72). When it was certain that 
the technology would work, subjects were less willing to engage in compensatory strategies. Perhaps they had 
made up their minds on which alternative to pursue and they did not want to compare and contrast 
alternatives to one another. There was also an interaction effect between framing and certainty on the use of 
noncompensatory strategies F(1, 29) = 3.73 p < .06. The positive, certain (M = 3.10) and positive, uncertain 
(M = 3.33) conditions were quite similar but the negative, certain (M = 6.80) and negative, uncertain (M = 
2.11) conditions were very different. Again, those in the certain condition and faced with a negative frame 
were much more likely to employ noncompensatory strategies than were those faced with certainty and a 
negative frame. There was also a close to significant interaction effect between framing and certainty on the 
number of cells accessed F(1, 29) = 3.99 p < .06 with the following means per condition: positive, certain (M 
= 8.30), positive, uncertain (M = 5.56), negative, certain (M = 4.80), and negative, uncertain (M = 8.22). The 
two “extreme” conditions led subjects to acquire more information. 
Using the z test for proportions we also found a significant main effect between framing and the decision 
strategy used, i.e., alternative versus dimension-based procedures, and subjects making the “correct” choice 
(defined as multiplying the numerical rating of the alternative by the subject’s own rating of a given 
dimension) (z = 2.22 p < .02). Twenty-nine percent of the subjects using alternative-based strategies were 
able to make the correct choice while only 9 percent using dimension-based strategies were able to do so (see 
Table 1). We also found a main effect for certainty and correct choice (z = 1.96 p < .03). Specifically, 27 
percent of those subjects using alternative-based strategies were able to make the correct choice, while only 7 
percent of those using dimension-based processes were able to do so (see Table 2). In other words, regardless 
of the framing or certainty condition, subjects using alternative-based procedures were more likely to make 
the correct choice compared to those using dimension-based processing. These findings are similar to 
previous findings wherein subjects using alternative-based strategies were better able to make “correct” 
choices (Ford et al. 1989; Payne, Bettman and Johnson 1988, 1993; Redd 2002). 
Table 1. Effect of Decision Strategy on Choice in the Context of Framing 
(National Defense University Military Subjects¾Second Phase) 
Decision Strategy 
Alternative-based Dimension-based 
29% 9% 
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Table 2. Effect of Decision Strategy on Choice in the Context of Certainty 
(National Defense University Military Subjects¾Second Phase) 
Decision Strategy 
Alternative-based Dimension-based 
27% 7% 
We also found a main effect for framing and the use of compensatory versus noncompensatory decision 
making (z = 2.20 p < .02) wherein those using compensatory strategies, regardless of a positive or negative 
frame, made the correct choice 17 percent of the time while those using noncompensatory strategies were 
unable to make the correct choice at all (0%) (see Table 3). We also found a main effect between certainty 
and the use of compensatory versus noncompensatory strategies (z = 2.16 p < .02) wherein those using 
compensatory strategies were able to choose correctly 15 percent of the time while those using 
noncompensatory strategies again failed to choose accurately (0%) (see Table 4). Again, these findings 
support previous results that showed that subjects using compensatory strategies were often better able to 
make “correct” choices (Redd 2002). 
Table 3. Effect of Decision Strategy on Choice in the Context of Framing 
(National Defense University Military Subjects¾Second Phase) 
Decision Strategy 
Compensatory (by dimension) Noncompensatory (by dimension) 
17% 0% 
Table 4. Effect of Decision Strategy on Choice in the Context of Certainty 
(National Defense University Military Subjects¾Second Phase) 
Decision Strategy 
Compensatory (by dimension) Noncompensatory (by dimension) 
15% 0% 
NDU First Phase-NDU Second Phase Military Subjects Comparison 
We compared NDU first phase subject responses with NDU second phase subject responses and 
generated the following results. There were no significant differences between the subjects in the two phases 
with respect to “doing something” versus “doing nothing,” between maximizing versus satisficing strategies, 
or between compensatory versus noncompensatory processing.  
Using ANOVA methods we did find a statistically significant difference between the two groups for the 
average number of cells accessed overall F(1, 81) = 5.08 p < .03, with subjects in the first phase accessing a 
mean of 9.04 cells (a median 9 cells), and subjects in the second phase only accessing on average 7.00 cells 
(also the median). Even though several months had transpired between the subjects’ first exposure to the 
decision task and their second encounter, they needed less information en route to their choice. It is also 
certainly plausible that the leadership course taken by the subjects at the National Defense University also 
contributed to their ability to make decisions with less information. We also found marginally significant 
differences in the average number of cells accessed when subjects were faced with positive framing F(1, 42) = 
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3.34 p < .07. Subjects in the first phase had a mean access rate of 9.24 cells (9 median) while those in the 
second phase only accessed an average of 7 cells (7 median). 
There was a also a statistically significant difference in the amount of time taken by subjects to access 
information in the two phases in terms of total number of seconds F(1, 81) = 18.41 p < .0001, where subjects 
in the first phase had a mean access time of 485.22 seconds while those in the second phase took only an 
average of 304.21 seconds accessing information. NDU subjects in the second phase not only accessed less 
information, but they also needed less time to choose among the available alternatives. Again, the leadership 
training at National Defense University may have led to this result. We also obtained significant results for 
time taken in each of the specific conditions: positive framing F(1, 42) = 13.20 p < .0008, 1st phase (M = 
523.6), 2nd phase (M = 301.26); negative framing F(1, 37) = 5.83 p < .02, 1st phase (M = 446.84), 2nd phase (M 
= 308.21); certainty F(1, 39) = 10.72 p < .002, 1st phase (M = 530.39), 2nd phase (M = 308.87); uncertainty 
F(1, 40) = 7.20 p < .01, 1st phase (M = 436.29), 2nd phase (M = 300.33). 
We also found differences in the Search Indexes for the two groups. Under certain conditions we found a 
marginally significant result F(1, 39) = 3.35 p < .07, where in the first phase subjects tended to pursue 
dimension-based strategies (M = -0.165) while those in the second phase employed more alternative-based 
strategies (M = 0.332). The finding for uncertain conditions was conventionally significant F(1, 40) = 7.20 p 
< .01, wherein subjects in the first phase operated by alternative (M = 0.418) while those in the second phase 
operated by dimension (M = -0.037). In the first phase of the experiment, subjects changed strategies 
depending upon the certainty with which the antiterrorism technologies were likely to succeed. When the 
alternatives were certain to succeed, the subjects preferred to access information by dimension, but when the 
technology was uncertain, subjects accessed information along each alternative. In the former, it appears that 
the subjects simply wanted to evaluate the alternatives based on their political, economic, and military utility, 
but when the technologies were uncertain, subjects endeavored to gain more information about each 
alternative in and of itself. In the second phase, subjects reverted to more typical decision strategies wherein 
they reduce cognitive strain in the uncertain conditions by resorting to dimension-based strategies (Russo and 
Dosher 1983). 
Finally we found a significant difference between the two groups with respect to noncompensatory 
decision making by dimension under uncertain conditions F(1, 40) = 4.52 p < .04, with subjects in the first 
phase using more compensatory strategies (M = 0.500), with subjects in the second phase still using 
compensatory strategies but to a lesser degree (M = 1.667). This result is further evidence that subjects in the 
second stage used more typical cognitive strain reducing strategies en route to choice. 
Conclusion 
Unlike the first phase there were no significant results in the second group for the influence of framing or 
certainty on alternative vs. dimension-based processing. We did find significant differences between the two 
groups in alternative vs. dimension-based strategies under certain and uncertain conditions. The first group 
used dimension-based processes when faced with certainty and alternative-based strategies under uncertain 
conditions. The second group did just the opposite. Subjects in the second phase were also marginally 
influenced by certainty in using compensatory vs. noncompensatory decision strategies. They tended to 
employ noncompensatory strategies when faced with certainty and compensatory strategies when 
encountering uncertainty. 
Whereas in the first group we tended to find main effects for framing or certainty and for interaction 
effects on correct choices, in the second group most of the results were main effects for decision strategy. 
Overall, subjects using alternative-based and compensatory strategies were able to make the correct choice 
while those employing dimension-based and noncompensatory strategies were much less likely to make the 
correct choice. 
We also found fundamental differences between the first and second groups in terms of time taken to 
access information and in the average number of cells accessed. Overall, subjects in the second phase tended 
to access less information and to take less time in making their decision. One could argue that this is merely 
an artifact of the fact that subjects were already familiar with the experimental task and platform so they used 
prior memory to help them make their decision instead of the information contained in the decision board. 
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While this is certainly a plausible argument and may be a contributing factor, we would point out that quite a 
few months transpired between the first and second phases of the experiment, limiting what the subjects 
would be able to specifically recall from their first experience with the decision board. What this can 
demonstrate is that when subjects are somewhat familiar with a choice task as a result of prior experience 
then we might expect them to require less information and to take less time in a subsequent choice task. 
Further research would benefit from exploring this phenomenon in greater detail and in repeated trials. 
Along these lines, we feel that both phases of the experimental study of military subjects at National 
Defense University offer some constructive applied lessons for decision makers operating in the real world of 
uncertainty and attempts by others to frame decision tasks. Perhaps the first lesson learned, regardless of 
certainty or uncertainty and positive vs. negative framing, is that experienced decision makers, such as the 
military officers at National Defense University, tend to prefer to “do something” even when “doing 
nothing” is an option and, in fact, even when it is the highest rated option (see Appendix B). This may be a 
function of the fact that this decision was basically a budgeting decision and it may be that experienced 
decision makers “never leave money on the table.” It could also be a function of the belief that in the “war on 
terrorism” it is better to pursue some solution than to put off making a decision for the foreseeable future. 
Directors, administrators, leaders and decision makers in general can make use of these tendencies when 
structuring decision tasks. For example, if an administrator is presenting alternatives for adoption to a 
superior or some other decision-making group he or she could structure the choice set so as to increase the 
likelihood that one or another option is selected as opposed to a lesser-preferred alternative or alternatives.  
Also, we see that when the military decision makers were initially faced with uncertainty in the first phase 
of the experiment they employed alternative-based processes in searching for information. This would imply 
their desire to familiarize themselves to a greater degree with antiterrorism technology since they were told 
that the technology was uncertain to be successful. However, in the second phase, when they were more 
familiar with the technology because of repeating the experimental simulation, they switched to more 
dimension-based strategies. This finding is interesting when we factor in what kinds of strategies lead to 
correct choices. Overall, subjects employing alternative and compensatory strategies were better able to make 
correct choices. While experienced decision makers often resort to cognitive shortcuts such as dimension-
based and noncompensatory strategies, it seems that they tend to make better choices when they employ 
more maximizing-type strategies such as alternative-based and compensatory processes (Herek, Janis, and 
Huth 1987). Again, those individuals in control of information, e.g., commanders, leaders, etc. might take 
these findings to heart. If group members receive too much information up front or if they are already 
familiar with the alternatives of a decision task they may be inclined to satisfice and undertake other cognitive 
shortcuts. Doing so may reduce the quality of their decisions. 
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